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Abstract 
 
This paper empirically examines whether voting coincidence in the United Nations General Assembly 
increases between donors and recipients after foreign aid is distributed. It extends previous literature by 
expanding the donor countries considered and by testing the long-run political influence of aid. The 
results show that Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom exhibit a positive relationship between 
voting coincidence and aid distribution. The results also show a positive relationship between voting 
coincidence and aid for the United States, but only in the long run when the yearly panels are collapsed 
into three-year averages. The latter result may provide an explanation for why previous studies find mixed 
results as to whether the United States uses aid for political support. The results are robust to the inclusion 
of measures of economic power, military power, dependence on foreign support, and international trade 
patterns.  
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 2 
Foreign Aid and Political Influence of the Development Assistance Committee Countries 
I. Introduction 
This paper empirically examines whether aid recipients adopt donor preferences by voting more 
frequently with donors in United Nations General Assembly roll call votes after receiving foreign aid. 
This analysis extends the literature exploring whether foreign aid influences the political relationship 
between aid donors and recipients in two ways. First, it expands the donor countries considered. While 
most previous research focuses exclusively on the United States, this paper considers each of the 22 
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
1
 Second, this paper tests the long-run 
political influence by collapsing the yearly panel into three-year averages and comparing the results to the 
basic model. The empirical results provide evidence that Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
exhibit a positive relationship between voting coincidence and foreign aid distribution. The results also 
show a positive relationship between voting coincidence and aid for the United States, but only in the 
long run when the yearly panels are collapsed into three-year averages. The latter result may provide an 
explanation for why previous studies find mixed results as to whether the United States uses aid for 
political support. The results are robust to the inclusion of measures of economic power, military power, 
dependence on foreign support, and international trade patterns.  
 Donor intention influences foreign aid distribution (Maizels and Nissanke 1984, White and 
Morrissey 1997, and Alesina and Dollar 2000) and while donor intention can be philanthropic, actual 
donor behavior shows donors are less altruistic then they claim (Meernik et al. 1998 and Langhammer 
2004). Numerous examples show that donors pursue their own self-interest in bilateral aid allocation 
(McGillivray 2003). USAID, the United States’ development agency, gives foreign assistance to “further 
America’s foreign policy interest in expanding democracy and free markets.”2 AusAid, Australia’s 
                                                          
1
 Single country members of the DAC used in the analysis are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. South Korea is excluded because 
it did not become a member until January 1, 2010. 
2
 http://www.usaid.ogv/about_usaid/ 
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development agency, grants aid “in line with Australia’s national interest.”3 Part of Canada’s aid agency’s 
mission is to “engage in policy development in Canada and internationally, enabling Canada’s effort to 
realize its development objectives” (italics added). 4 With their aid, France promotes French culture, 
Japan furthers its economic interests (Schraeder et al. 1998), and Portugal supports the diffusion of its 
language.
5
 
 DAC countries are used in the analysis because they are the primary donors of bilateral Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and each DAC country has a major foreign aid program according to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Between 1991 and 2008, DAC 
countries conferred 74 percent of total ODA compared to 2.5 percent for non-DAC countries and 23.5 
percent for multilateral aid agencies In only one year  since 1991 was the percentage of total bilateral 
ODA given by DAC countries lower than 71 percent (60.6 percent in 2006).  Since 1991, 15 of the 22 
DAC countries have contributed at least one percent of total bilateral ODA, five countries have given at 
least five percent of total ODA, and two countries (Japan and the United States) have granted at least ten 
percent of total ODA. 
  
II. Literature Review 
Donors use aid to influence decisions in international organizations. In their examination of the UN 
Security Council, Kuziemko and Werker (2006) find nonpermanent members receive an average of $16 
million of additional funding from the United States and $1 million of additional funding from the UN 
during “typical” years, just for their council membership.  During years where the Security Council is 
placed in the spotlight, nonpermanent members receive $45 million of additional funding from the US 
and $8 million of additional funding from the UN. 
                                                          
3
 http://www.ausaid.gov.au/ 
4
 www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/acdi-cida/ 
5
 http://www.ipan.mne.gov/pt/ 
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 Voting behavior of aid recipients is also targeted using the multilateral aid of the IMF and World 
Bank, even though using multilateral aid is an indirect avenue of influence since donors lack direct 
control over these funds. Oatley and Yackee (2004) and Barro and Lee (2005) find the IMF grants 
additional money to governments closely aligned with the United States. Faini and Grilli (2004) report 
World Bank and IMF lending is largely influenced by the United States and the European Union. Thacker 
(1999), Stone (2002), and Dreher and Jensen (2007) show developing countries receive more favorable 
borrowing terms from the IMF when they have closer ties to the US while Dreher and Sturm (2006) show 
countries receiving financial support from the IMF and World Bank vote more frequently with G7 
countries in the UN General Assembly. 
The most frequently researched area concerning foreign aid and political support is the use of 
bilateral ODA in influencing the voting behavior of recipient countries in the UN General Assembly. 
Three reasons may explain this research clustering. First, all roll call votes are recorded in every session 
for all voting members, creating an availability of data. Second, the UN is an important player in 
international affairs. Lastly, donors have direct control of bilateral ODA so they can use it for their own 
purposes, including building political influence. It is no surprise then that G7 countries closely monitor 
the voting behavior of other countries (Anderson et al. 2006). For example, the US State Department has 
kept records of the voting coincidence rates of member countries for “important” votes since 1983.   
The empirical evidence that donors successfully use bilateral foreign aid to shape recipients’ 
voting behavior is inconclusive and mixed. Kato (1969), Kegley and Hook (1991), Sexton and Decker 
(1992), Dreher and Sturm (2006), and Morey and Lai (2006) find aid is an ineffective instrument in 
influencing recipient voting behavior. However, Bernstein and Alpert (1971), Rai (1972 and 1980), 
Wittkopf (1973), Lundborg (1998), Wang (1999), and Dreher et al. (2008) find foreign aid increases 
voting coincidence between donor and recipient. Some of these studies utilize short time horizons with 
correlation analysis or bivariate regressions while other studies employ longer time horizons and panel 
estimation techniques, but none of the empirical methods show a consistent positive relationship between 
foreign aid and voting coincidence. 
 5 
In most of these studies the aid donor considered is the United States. However, some studies 
have expanded the scope of donor countries considered. Wittkopf (1973) focuses on the 16 members of 
the DAC in 1973 and the Soviet Bloc. Lundborg (1998) analyzes the US and Soviet Union. Dreher et al. 
(2008) considers the G7 countries. This paper extends the analysis further by considering all 22 of the 
DAC countries in order to provide a fuller picture of the relationship between bilateral foreign aid and 
political support between donor and recipient. 
 
 
III. Data and Estimation 
3.1 Descriptions of data and variables 
This paper employs a panel for each of the DAC countries with 155 recipient countries from 1991 to 
2008. Data is unavailable for each variable in every year so the number of observations in each regression 
depends on the choice of control variables. Summary statistics and a detailed variable description are 
provided in Appendices 1 and 2 respectively.  
 The basic specification is of the empirical model is: 
Voting Coincidencei,t =  αi  + β1LevelODAi,t-1 + β2Democracyi,t-1 + β3National Capabilitiesi,t-1  + ηt + εit (1) 
where i and t are the country and year indices, respectively, αi represents country fixed effects, and  ηt 
represents time effects. In some specifications, a lagged dependent variable is included. 
 The dependent variable is Voting Coincidence, a measure of active agreement in policy positions 
in the UN General Assembly between countries since donor countries may “bribe recipient governments 
not only to comply, but also to avoid non-compliance” (Dreher et al. 2008). Voting coincidences are 
based on voting records from the United Nations Bibliographic Information System (UNBISNET), which 
records all resolutions along with each member’s status and voting actions. Voting actions are recorded as 
‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘Abstentions’, and ‘Non-Voting’. Voting coincidence is calculated as the ratio of the total 
number of times two countries’ votes match to the number of resolutions with a roll call vote in the same 
 6 
year.
6
 All roll call votes are included because not all votes are similarly important for the countries 
considered and determining which votes are “important” is subjective.7 Therefore the general approach 
for using all votes is preferable to focusing on a subjective set of “important” votes (Wittkopf 1973, 
Kegley and McGowan 1981, and Dreher et al. 2008). 
 The key independent variable is the annual amount of a DAC country’s ODA as a proportion of 
total ODA received by the recipient country. This variable assesses the extent to which an aid recipient 
relies on an individual donor for development assistance (Wang 1999).
8
 Aid disbursements rather than 
commitments are used because disbursements represent an actual transfer of financial resources. Not all 
commitments are honored by donors, so disbursements are more likely to affect aid recipient behavior 
(Asiedu and Nandwa 2007). 
 The other control variables are measurements of democracy and national capability. The 
democracy variable is a dichotomous dummy variable from Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) 
classifying a country as a democracy or not. It is included because democratic countries vote together 
(Thacker 1999 and Voeten 2000) and UN voting blocks are relatively stable (Holcombe and Sobel 1996). 
The national capability variable is a measure of “hard” power, or power obtained through economic or 
military means as opposed to “soft” power, which is power produced through diplomacy, history, or 
culture. It is included because stronger countries show foreign policy defiance, possibly resulting in a 
lower voting coincidence (Wang 1999), and national capability is robustly associated with UN voting 
behavior (Dreher and Sturm 2006).  
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 The denominator for voting coincidence is larger when abstentions and absences are included. For example, 
consider a scenario with fifteen total votes and two countries. When abstentions and absences are included, if 
country A votes with country B five times, opposite five times, and has three abstentions and two absences, the 
voting coincidence is 33 percent (5/15). When abstentions and absences are excluded, the voting coincidence is 50 
percent (5/10).  
7
 Unanimous and near unanimous votes are sometimes excluded because such votes are more likely ceremonial 
rather than in areas where policy disagreement arises. However, such exclusions are subjective and sometimes these 
votes have significant meaning for the countries in the minority.  
8 ODA is measured by the OECD as grants + loans – repayment of loans. Net disbursements will be negative for 
years where repayments on loans made by the recipient country exceed ODA disbursements to that country.   
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3.2 Methodology 
Fixed country and time effects are included in all regressions as specified by the Hausman test. Since the 
aid measures may be endogenous because aid could adjust to voting patterns (i.e. rewarding aid recipients 
for “good behavior”) and the possibility that voting coincidence and aid are jointly influenced by common 
determinants (Dreher et al. 2008), various estimation techniques are employed.         
 Regressions are first estimated with Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) for the non-Nordic 
countries. Following Kilby (2006) and Dreher et al. (2008), the 2SLS estimation uses “good donor” 
instruments for the aid variables of the non-Nordic countries as suggested by Fleck and Kilby (2006a and 
2006b). The instruments are the ODA variables of the Nordic countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden) because their aid is correlated with the aid patterns of the other DAC countries 
since donors focus on the same set of ‘aid darlings’ (Theile et al. 2007) and because their aid is not 
affected by the UN voting behavior of aid recipients (Stokke 1989, Alesina and Dollar 2000, and Gates 
and Hoeffler 2004).  
 The difference GMM estimator of Arellano and Bond (1991), another method of correcting for 
possible endogeneity, is employed to check the robustness of the 2SLS results. The GMM results are 
based on the one-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2006) and use the lagged levels of the 
regressors as instruments for the first-differenced regressors. For the non-Nordic countries, the “good 
donor” instruments are also included. The standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary 
patterns of autocorrelation within countries. The Hansen J test is used to determine the validity of the 
instruments (the null hypothesis is that the instruments as a group are exogenous) and the Arellano-Bond 
test of second-order autocorrelation, which detects autocorrelation in levels, is used to determine whether 
the estimator is consistent.
9
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 The null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test of second-order autocorrelation is the absence of autocorrelation and 
is applied to the differenced residuals. A higher p-value is preferred.   
 8 
IV. The Basic Model 
4.1 Results  
Table 1 reports the results when estimated with 2SLS for the non-Nordic countries.  
[Insert Table 1] 
The instruments appear valid since the Hansen J statistic does not reject the overidentifying restrictions at 
conventional levels of significance.
10
 The results show a ten percent increase in the share of foreign aid 
increases voting coincidence by 0.89 percent for Belgium, 0.091 percent for Canada, 0.051 percent for 
France, 0.126 percent for Germany, 1.389 percent for New Zealand, 0.021 percent for Spain, and 0.076 
percent for the United Kingdom.  The foreign aid coefficients for Belgium, Canada, France, New 
Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom are strongly statistically significant at the 1 percent level while 
Germany’s coefficient is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficients are expected according to the general hypothesis that countries use foreign aid to 
increase voting coincidence among aid recipients. 
 However, Japan has a negative coefficient on aid (-0.022). This result is in-line with Dreher et al. 
(2008) who find program aid for Japan, which comprises 20.8 percent of Japanese total aid, has a negative 
effect on voting coincidence. The empirical results also match the negative correlation between average 
ODA and average voting coincidence (Figure 1).  
[Insert Figure 1] 
The non-positive coefficient supports the notion in the aid literature that Japan uses its foreign aid for 
economic rather than political reasons. If so, a measure of voting coincidence in the UN General 
Assembly may be an inappropriate measure of foreign aid influence for countries using aid to influence 
factors other than political interests.  
 Table 2 reports the difference GMM estimates for the basic model and the number of instruments 
included. For each country except for Portugal, the number of instruments is fewer than the number of 
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 These results are in-line with Dreher et al. (2008) who find the instruments are valid.  
 9 
groups (countries), satisfying a standard rule of thumb regarding instrument proliferation (Roodman 
2006). 
 [Insert Table 2] 
 The results show a positive relationship between voting coincidence and foreign aid share for 
Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom, with similar magnitudes and statistical significance (at 
the 1 percent level) to the 2SLS results. The aid coefficients for Belgium, Germany, and New Zealand 
turn statistically insignificant. Germany’s 2SLS result was statistically weak so adding additional 
instruments in the estimation may explain the statistical insignificance of the variable of interest. Whereas 
Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom all rank among the top nine in foreign aid distribution 
(eighth, third, ninth, and fifth respectively), Belgium and New Zealand rank fourteenth and twenty-second 
respectively.  These results suggest the size of aid distribution may matter in changing voting 
coincidence. 
 As expected from the aid literature, the aid coefficient is insignificant for all of the Nordic 
countries, providing evidence that the Nordic countries grant aid for non-political motivations.  Japan 
again shows a statistically significant negative relationship giving additional credence for Japan using 
foreign aid for reasons other than political influence. Italy and Finland also show negative relationships 
between voting coincidence and foreign aid share.
11
 Italy’s result is in line with Dreher et al. (2008) who 
find project aid has a negative effect on voting coincidence. Finland’s results may be explained by its aid 
behavior since it focuses its aid to recipients in its geographical region so political considerations may be 
of second order importance (Gates and Hoeffler 2004). 
4.2 Interpretation 
The empirical results may differ for countries for two reasons. First, countries pursue multiple 
objectives when granting aid (Isenman and Ehrenpreis 2003) so political influence may not be of first-
order significance. It would be unreasonable to assume each country has the same objectives with their 
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 Like Japan the negative relationship between voting coincidence and foreign aid is seen in the raw data graphs 
when average ODA is plotted with average voting coincidence over the time period analyzed (see Figure 1). 
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aid programs, even if the rhetoric of mission statements converges to a few main themes such as poverty 
reduction. 
 Second, the results could be interpreted as a lower bound of political influence because of the 
similar voting coincidence rates among DAC countries (see Table 3) and the possibility of free riding. 
The high DAC voting coincidences provides an incentive for countries to achieve their political goals by 
free riding off countries that share their same political goals and also grant foreign aid. The free riding 
country could further its political agenda without sharing the cost of aid distribution. 
 This hypothesis is explored using factor analysis, which analyzes the voting patterns of the DAC 
countries.
12
 If the voting patterns of the DAC countries are similar, the argument of free riding is 
strengthened. The factor analysis condenses all the similarities in the voting patterns for the DAC 
countries and identifies two significant factors explaining voting groups within the DAC.
13
 Factor one 
(i.e. the DAC factor) explains 81.1 percent of the total variation in voting patterns among all the DAC 
countries. On average all the DAC countries, except for the United States, have a 91.2 percent correlation 
with the DAC factor.  The United States has a 42.9 percent correlation with the DAC factor. An 
interpretation of this result is that all 22 DAC countries, even the United States, vote together on most UN 
roll call votes. This is not surprising since democracies and countries with similar wealth levels tend to 
vote together.  
   The second factor (in factor analysis the factors are unrelated) describes the votes where the 
United States voted contrary to the other DAC countries. This factor (i.e. the Israel factor) explains 4.7 
percent of the total variance in DAC countries. The voting behavior of the United States accounts for a 
large proportion of the variance within this factor and the United States is the only DAC country with a 
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 Factor analysis depends on an ordinal scale of value for the data being analyzed and does not accept missing 
values. Therefore, two changes were made to the voting data. The first was how the votes were scaled. ‘Yes’ votes 
were given a value of 1, ‘No’ votes were given a value of -1, and ‘Abstentions’ and ‘Non-Voting’ were given values 
of 0 (see Rummel 1970). The second change regards Switzerland. Switzerland did not join the UN until 2002 but 
because the missing data points need to be assigned a value (i.e. the votes that were cast before Switzerland joined 
the UN need to be classified), all the roll call votes prior to 2002 for Switzerland were assigned the neutral value of 
0. Given Switzerland’s historic stance of neutrality on world issues, this assumption seems justified. 
13
 Factor analysis produces the same number of factors as variables (22 in this case). However, only the first two 
factors were kept because their eigenvalues were greater than one, satisfying the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser 1960).  
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high correlation (78.5 percent) with the factor. The average correlation for the other 21 DAC countries is -
2.4 percent. Australia, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom are positively correlated with the Israel 
factor, just weakly correlated. The correlations provide evidence the United States is the only DAC 
country that on a semi-consistent basis votes differently from the DAC voting bloc. These different votes 
specifically concern issues involving Israel. When Israel is included in the factor analysis, the correlation 
between the United States and the second factor increases to 80.4 percent and Israel’s correlation with 
factor two is 79.5 percent, providing evidence that factor two describes votes when Israel and the United 
States are in conflict with the other DAC countries.   
The results of the factor analysis suggest that if free riding is a significant problem and the 
regression results represent a lower bound of political influence, countries are unlikely to free ride off the 
United States and are more likely free ride off of other countries. An effort to identify what countries are 
free riding and who they are free riding off of may be an attractive avenue of future research.
14
           
 
V. Sensitivity Analyses 
This section tests the robustness of the GMM estimation to the inclusion of additional variables suggested 
in the literature as possible determinants of voting coincidence. These include measures of economic 
power (GDP per capita and real GDP growth), foreign dependence (external debt), a different measure of 
“hard” power (the percentage of the labor force who are armed service personnel), and international trade 
patterns (imports and exports).  The final robustness check collapses the yearly panel into three-year 
averages to analyze long-term trends and smooth out business cycles and international shocks, which may 
affect aid allocation.  
Measures of economic power, foreign dependence, and “hard” power are included because 
stronger countries with easy access to capital may be less likely accept bribes and less likely to vote with 
DAC countries compared to countries who have constrained access to private capital and may need  
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In related research, Mascarenhas and Sandler (2006) find evidence that donors view the contributions of other 
countries as complementary but uncover no evidence of cooperative behavior among countries. 
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public support such as foreign aid (Dreher et al. 2008). However, dependence may be higher in times of 
crises, making it more difficult to access private capital. Therefore, less economically secure countries 
may need more assistance from economically stronger countries in these times, particularly when dealing 
with debt issues (Edwards 2003 and Cassimon and Campenhout 2007.) Thus, while these measures may 
be important determinants of voting coincidence, their impact on voting patterns is a priori ambiguous. 
International trade patterns may also be important to voting coincidence since trade measures 
foreign influence (Stone 2004) and creates similar preferences among trading partners and greater 
cooperation (Oneal and Russet 1999). This increased dependency may increase a country’s 
responsiveness to external pressure, leading to voting compliance with the trading partner, particularly if 
the trading partner is large, or if the recipient fears losing access to the markets of the donor (Keohane 
1967). However, strong economic ties with developed countries may create feelings of exploitation and 
could reduce voting coincidence (Kim and Russett 1996). Again, while trade may be important, its impact 
on voting patterns is a priori ambiguous. 
 Table 4 includes GDP per capita as a measure of economic wealth. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The basic GMM results hold as a ten percent increase in the share of foreign aid increases voting 
coincidence by 0.058 percent for Canada, 0.021 percent for France, 0.015 percent or Spain, and 0.031 
percent for the United Kingdom, all similar magnitudes to the basic model. The aid coefficients for the 
Nordic countries are again statistically insignificant. Japan, Italy, and Finland each maintain their negative 
coefficients on aid and with similar magnitudes to the basic model.   
Table 5 includes real GDP growth as a measure of economic progress.  
[Insert Table 5] 
The basic result for the variable of interest holds. Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom have 
positive and statistically significant coefficients on the foreign aid variable with almost identical 
coefficient sizes as the basic model. Japan, Italy, and Finland keep their negative coefficients, though the 
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Hansen J statistic suggests the instruments for Italy may not be valid in this specification. The aid 
coefficients for the Nordic countries are statistically insignificant.  
 Table 6 contains external debt as a measure of foreign dependence. The results show external 
debt is more important than the other economic power variables. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 The coefficient on external debt is statistically significant and positive for 9 of the 22 countries, giving 
support to the hypothesis of Dreher et al. (2008) that a country with more debt may have a greater reliance 
on foreign aid and would increase its voting coincidence with the donor country. The basic results for the 
foreign aid variables are similar to earlier specifications. Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
have positive and statistically significant coefficients on the variable of interest, the Nordic countries have 
statistically insignificant coefficients on the variable of interest, and Japan, Italy, Finland, and Portugal 
and statistically significant negative coefficients on the aid variables. While Portugal’s results match the 
raw data (see Figure 1), the results are suspect because the number of instruments is greater than the 
number of groups, as evidenced by the high Hansen J statistic. 
 Table 7 employs another measure of “hard” power, the percentage of the labor force that is armed 
service personnel (AFPTL).  
[Insert Table 7] 
Like the argument for national capability, the more formidable a country’s military is the more likely it 
can be politically independent and reduce its voting coincidence with donor countries.  The coefficient is 
the expected negative sign but only statistically significant for Austria and Greece. The coefficients for 
foreign aid are analogous with previous specifications. 
 Table 8 includes imports and Table 9 includes exports as measures of international trade.  
[Insert Table 8] 
[Insert Table 9] 
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While the export measure is statistically significant in seven of the DAC countries, the imports measure is 
statistically significant in only two countries. The coefficients for foreign aid are similar with previous 
specifications. 
The final robustness check collapses the yearly panel into three-year averages and is estimated 
with the difference GMM estimator (Table 10). Switzerland is dropped because of a lack of observations.  
[Insert Table 10] 
The results confirm the basic results for Canada, France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the Nordic 
countries. They also show some different results. Belgium, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal, and the 
United States have positive and statistically significant coefficients for the variable of interest while 
negative coefficients on the variable of interest for Finland and Italy turn statistically insignificant. The 
results for Ireland and Portugal should be considered with caution because the Arellano-Bond test of 
second order autocorrelation suggests autocorrelation is present. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient for the United States’ aid variable suggests the United States uses aid for political influence 
but that its influence is only seen in the long-run. This result may help reconcile the conflicting results 
found in the aid literature concerning whether aid increases voting coincidence with the United States.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper empirically tests the hypothesis that aid recipients adopt donor preferences by voting more 
frequently with donors in United Nations General Assembly roll call votes after receiving foreign aid. 
This paper extends the previous research on the political influence of foreign aid by expanding the donor 
countries considered and testing the long-run political influence of foreign aid on voting coincidence.  
These extensions were chosen for two reasons. First, while each of the DAC countries has a significant 
foreign aid program according to the OECD, most previous research focused on a smaller sub-set of 
donors. Second, previous research shows mixed results as to whether the United States successfully 
increases voting coincidence with its aid. The estimation procedure employs instrument variable and 
difference GMM estimation to account for the possible endogenous nature of foreign aid. 
 15 
  The results provide evidence the foreign aid of Canada, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom 
increases voting coincidence and affirm previous literature that the Nordic countries of Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden do not use aid for political reasons. The results also provide an 
explanation for why previous studies are mixed in their conclusions as to whether the United States uses 
aid for political support. When yearly panels are estimated, the results do not show evidence the United 
States uses aid for political support. However, when the yearly panels are collapsed into three-year 
averages, voting coincidence increases with the United States. The results are robust to the inclusion of 
variables measuring economic and military power, dependence on foreign support, and international trade 
patterns.  
 The empirical results may be interpreted as a lower bound of political influence because donor 
countries with similar voting coincidences may engage in free riding behavior. This leads to some 
possible future research opportunities. Do donors seek to maximize their international influence across 
multiple international organizations or do they focus on a subset? Do countries free ride in securing 
influence in one organization so they can devote their resources to influencing another organization? 
Also, does free riding affect how much aid donors give? 
 The results do not offer clear policy conclusions. To some extent, aid distribution is politically 
motivated by donor interests and donors have been slow to reform. This is particularly true if such 
reforms are not in the best interests of the donors, especially if donors derive utility from the political gain 
aid donations may secure. Therefore, the slow progress of reform should serve as a caution to plans of 
quickly removing political components of aid. Increasing the transparency of aid practices may be the 
most reasonable and effective goal for reformers to pursue. Transparency may increase donor 
accountability and the incentives for donors at the margin may shift from political considerations to the 
humanitarian needs of the recipient. Such a change would align the reasons donors claim to give aid with 
their actions. 
Figure 1: Official Development Assistance and Voting Coincidence for Select Countries 1991-2008 
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Table 1: Bilateral ODA and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries (2SLS)  
 
Variable United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Italy Canada Spain Australia
Level ODA (t -1) 0.0001 -0.0022 0.0051 0.0126 0.0076 -0.0849 0.0091 0.0021 0.0424
(0.0001) (0.0004)*** (0.0009)*** (0.0077)* (0.0013)*** (0.0533) (0.0019)*** (0.0003)*** (0.7741)
Democracy (t -1) 0.0178 0.7829 0.5726 0.3068 0.7283 -0.8064 0.0976 0.4996 0.1175
(0.7900) (1.9228) (1.5324) (1.7836) (1.6132) (1.7434) (1.8263) (1.9581) (1.8788)
National Capabilities (t -1) 1.4515 0.3592 -0.1703 0.0266 0.1351 0.0659 0.0928 -0.0876 -0.1837
(1.0310) (0.2455) (0.2094) (0.2527) (0.2226) (0.2483) (0.2503) (0.2549) (0.2930)
R-squared (within) 0.63 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.27 0.22 0.13 0.09 0.40
Number of countries 102 101 102 102 101 100 102 95 80
Number of observations 1206 1239 1254 1256 1224 1161 1248 1051 796
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.97 0.94 0.38 0.99 0.40 0.16
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
Variable Belgium Switzerland Austria Finland Portugal Ireland Greece Luxembourg New Zealand
Level ODA (t -1) 0.0890 -0.0056 0.0241 -1.5065 -0.9263 -1.9144 0.0337 -2.6871 1.3894
(0.0216)*** (0.8557) (0.1644) (1.2636) (1.8635) (4.2058) (5.7893) (3.0428) (0.2238)***
Democracy (t -1) -0.1829 2.1702 -1.7613 2.3419 -0.0163 1.8459 0.2943 -0.8804 1.6839
(1.8565) (3.4449) (3.5030) (1.6378) (5.0694) (2.0091) (1.6692) (1.671) (1.5937)
National Capabilities (t -1) 0.2799 -0.3684 -0.0979 0.0628 0.2239 -0.0875 0.3109 0.0095 -0.3124
(0.2244) (0.5303) (0.2175) (0.2528) (0.5088) (0.6797) (0.7238) (0.5799) (0.3344)
R-squared (within) 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.16
Number of countries 100 91 123 96 61 92 76 88 75
Number of observations 1153 532 822 1101 356 1008 505 867 815
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.44 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.37 0.24 0.24 0.42 0.64
 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
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Table 2: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries (GMM) 
 
Variable United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Canada Spain Norway Sweden
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.1522 0.0871 0.1527 0.1846 0.1437 0.2187 0.2660 0.2091 0.1451 0.2117 0.1946
(0.1291) (0.1081) (0.1074) (0.1119)* (0.1107) (0.0737)*** (0.1116)** (0.1052)** (0.1057) (0.0885)** (0.0909)**
Level ODA (t -1) 0.0001 -0.0011 0.0024 0.0006 0.0037 0.0411 -0.0930 0.0069 0.0017 -1.6652 0.2574
(0.0001) (0.0004)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0146) (0.0014)*** (0.0529) (0.0343)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0005)*** (1.1997) (0.4434)
Democracy (t -1) 1.2969 0.5989 1.2876 1.8322 1.9309 3.5134 1.9254 0.0231 1.5409 2.4761 3.9890
(1.0102) (2.2146) (2.0791) (2.2840) (2.2344) (2.5630) (2.6632) (0.0218) (2.4864) (2.8484) (2.9096)
National Capabilities (t -1) 0.7211 0.5244 0.0462 0.5734 -0.1297 -0.2511 -0.2314 0.8712 -0.8183 1.1745 -0.6298
(0.8888) (1.1886) (1.1357) (1.0335) (0.9686) (1.3068) (0.9401) (1.1477) (0.7679) (2.2626 (1.3881)
Number of countries 98 97 98 98 97 139 97 98 92 125 124
Number of observations 1010 1041 1057 1061 1025 1790 944 1054 855 1580 1580
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.11 0.38 0.57 0.23 0.54 0.17 0.41 0.29 0.48 0.22 0.14
Number of instruments 53 53 53 53 53 34 53 53 53 34 34
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.29 0.56 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.26 0.10 0.03  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
 
Variable Denmark Australia Belgium Switzerland Austria Finland Portugal Ireland Greece Luxembourg New Zealand
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.2956 0.1137 0.0915 0.1265 -0.0771 0.2273 0.1543 0.1579 0.0804 0.1457 0.0615
(0.0868)*** (0.1196) (0.1101) (0.1302) (0.1507) (0.1222)* (0.1397) (0.1249) (0.0707) (0.0867)* (0.1169)
Level ODA (t -1) 0.4241 -0.0330 0.0326 0.0535 -0.0826 -2.7679 -0.7211 -1.6281 -0.2867 -0.9907 -0.9639
(0.6543) (2.7518) (0.0232) (0.7240) (0.2239) (0.8163)*** (0.4966) (1.7734) (0.3400) (0.9020) (3.3671)
Democracy (t -1) 2.7669 -1.1876 -0.5124 5.0319 11.2934 0.7342 0.6909 0.9546 0.7053 3.3701 2.2978
(2.7804) 2.7518 (3.5414) (2.3755)** (4.4379)*** (3.0578) (3.1986) (2.6288) (1.9611) (3.4052) (3.6003)
National Capabilities (t -1) -0.5805 2.4593 0.6459 0.0101 -0.1510 0.1781 1.1981 0.3443 -1.2606 0.9460 -0.4846
(1.1134) (2.4323) (1.2381) (0.8163) (0.2147) (1.2978) (3.2817 (1.0216) (1.5186) (1.5167) (1.2981)
Number of countries 113 68 96 83 107 89 51 88 65 85 69
Number of observations 1233 629 945 348 338 913 219 832 366 655 665
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.06 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.24 0.716 0.69 0.01 0.28 0.36 0.91
Number of instruments 34 53 53 21 53 53 53 53 38 53 53
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.12 0.47 0.15 0.52 0.53 0.26 0.86 0.07 0.17 0.28 0.16  
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
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Table 3: Average Voting Coincidence Rates Among Development Assistance Committee Countries from 1991 to 2008 
 
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Japan Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States
Australia 1.00
Austria 0.84 1.00
Belgium 0.81 0.92 1.00
Canada 0.86 0.86 0.87 1.00
Denmark 0.82 0.93 0.95 0.88 1.00
Finland 0.83 0.94 0.95 0.89 0.95 1.00
France 0.72 0.82 0.86 0.76 0.83 0.83 1.00
Germany 0.80 0.91 0.97 0.87 0.94 0.95 0.85 1.00
Greece 0.78 0.88 0.87 0.80 0.89 0.88 0.78 0.87 1.00
Ireland 0.82 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.91 0.91 0.81 0.90 0.87 1.00
Italy 0.81 0.93 0.96 0.87 0.95 0.94 0.85 0.96 0.88 0.91 1.00
Japan 0.79 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.87 0.86 0.74 0.84 0.80 0.85 0.85 1.00
Luxembourg 0.81 0.92 0.98 0.88 0.96 0.96 0.86 0.97 0.88 0.90 0.96 0.85 1.00
Netherlands 0.80 0.91 0.97 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.85 0.97 0.87 0.89 0.96 0.85 0.97 1.00
New Zealand 0.86 0.89 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.76 0.84 0.82 0.91 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 1.00
Norway 0.82 0.92 0.93 0.88 0.95 0.94 0.81 0.92 0.87 0.90 0.93 0.85 0.94 0.93 0.96 1.00
Portugal 0.83 0.93 0.94 0.86 0.95 0.93 0.83 0.94 0.90 0.92 0.96 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.86 0.93 1.00
Spain 0.82 0.92 0.92 0.84 0.93 0.90 0.83 0.91 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.84 0.92 0.91 0.85 0.91 0.95 1.00
Sweden 0.82 0.95 0.91 0.86 0.93 0.94 0.80 0.91 0.86 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.92 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.89 1.00
Switzerland 0.75 0.95 0.93 0.81 0.93 0.95 0.83 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.86 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 1.00
United Kingdom 0.71 0.80 0.85 0.77 0.84 0.83 0.90 0.85 0.76 0.79 0.84 0.75 0.85 0.86 0.75 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.80 0.81 1.00
United States 0.38 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.44 0.39 0.33 0.34 0.39 0.33 0.39 0.40 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.29 0.51 1.00  
Note: Values range from 0.00 to 1.00 with a value of 0.00 interpreted as the two countries never voting in agreement and a value of 1.00 interpreted as two 
countries voting in full agreement.  
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Table 4: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including GDP Per Capita (GMM) 
Variable United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Canada Spain Norway Sweden
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.1137 0.0701 0.1145 0.1382 0.1111 0.2081 0.2157 0.1736 0.1475 0.1891 01592
(0.1299) (0.1089) (0.1062) (0.1119) (0.1088) (0.0729)*** (0.1111)** (0.1061)* (0.1115) (0.0917)** (0.0928)*
Level ODA (t -1) 0.0001 -0.0009 0.0021 -0.0016 0.0031 0.0420 -0.0937 0.0058 0.0015 -0.7016 01748
(0.0001) (0.0005)** (0.0009)*** (0.0157) (0.0015)** (0.0517) (0.0380)** (0.0022)*** (0.0005)*** (1.0401) (0.3226)
Democracy (t -1) 1.3072 0.5139 1.2005 1.6262 1.9634 3.3467 1.6909 2.0519 1.5837 2.8616 3.8062
(1.0041) (2.2019) (2.0075) (2.1852) (2.1864) (2.5394) (2.5266) (2.0993) (2.5134) (2.7367) (2.8286)
National Capabilities (t -1) 1.1066 -0.3084 -0.6934 -0.2617 -0.7301 -0.4009 -1.0491 0.1136 -1.3602 0.2623 -0.7326
(1.1073) 0.8644) (0.7913) (0.9145) (0.8047) (1.0436) (0.8925) (0.8298) (0.7472)* (1.4088) (1.0179)
GDPC (t -1) -0.0001 0.0040 0.0027 0.0023 0.0033 -0.0007 0.0039 0.0029 0.0033 0.0001 -0.0011
(0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0025) (0.0055) (0.0031)
Number of countries 96 93 93 93 93 131 92 93 88 119 116
Number of observations 966 1005 1006 1010 976 1690 901 1003 837 1488 1483
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.16 0.46 0.83 0.39 0.77 0.15 0.55 0.34 0.51 0.20 0.30
Number of instruments 54 54 54 54 54 35 54 54 54 35 35
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.32 0.57 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.36 0.03 0.08  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
 
Variable Denmark Australia Belgium Switzerland Austria Finland Portugal Ireland Greece Luxembourg New Zealand
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.2508 0.0687 0.0729 0.1646 -0.0999 0.1652 0.1587 0.0901 0.0949 0.1547 0.0164
(0.0882)*** (0.1126) (0.1063) (0.1444) (0.1459) (0.1224) (0.1259) (0.1317) (0.0674) (0.0881)* (0.1301)
Level ODA (t -1) 0.2707 -0.0612 0.0258 0.3948 -0.0584 -2.2697 -0.7446 -1.7699 -0.1704 -0.8338 2.0843
(0.5335) (0.0988) (0.0265) (0.9006) (0.2197) (1.0101)** (0.4757) (1.8301) (0.2998) (0.7635) (2.9717)
Democracy (t -1) 2.6348 -0.9583 -0.5834 5.4206 10.797 0.9213 0.9987 1.1637 0.9208 3.4637 2.7120
(2.6548) (2.6631) (3.5051) (2.5567)** (4.4116)** 2.9344 (3.1736) (2.4809) (1.9823) (3.3889) (3.4698)
National Capabilities (t -1) -0.6729 1.8749 0.1384 0.0789 -0.0459 -0.8048 -0.9810 -0.0016 -2.4703 0.4442 -1.4392
(0.8638) (2.0534) (1.1818) (0.9843) (0.2609) (0.8818) (3.0897) (1.0583) (1.8401) (1.0704) (0.9246)
GDPC (t -1) -0.0000 0.0007 0.0036 0.0025 -0.0034 0.0034 0.0145 0.0007 0.0111 -0.0029 0.0052
(0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0024) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0075)* (0.0046) (0.0062)* (0.0034) (0.0024)
Number of countries 108 64 92 78 102 84 48 84 61 80 65
Number of observations 1178 586 917 325 320 864 207 788 347 617 626
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.06 0.56 0.60 0.62 0.29 0.84 0.58 0.03 0.49 0.23 0.99
Number of instruments 35 54 54 22 54 54 48 54 39 54 54
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.24 0.40 0.16 0.56 0.37 0.21 0.93 0.14 0.07 0.45 0.12  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
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Table 5: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including GDP Growth (GMM) 
Variable United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Canada Spain Norway Sweden
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.1173 0.0667 0.1125 0.1396 0.1032 0.2141 0.2151 0.1709 0.1440 0.1833 0.1604
(0.1293) (0.1099) (0.1075) (0.1131) (0.1111) (00743)*** (0.1137)* (0.1059) (0.1114) (0.0864)** (0.0925)*
Level ODA (t -1) 0.0001 -0.0012 0.0025 -0.0003 0.0038 0.0424 -0.0949 0.0069 0.0018 -0.6809 0.1623
(0.0001) (0.0005)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0159) (0.0015)*** (0.0519) (0.0357)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0005)*** (1.1065) (0.3189)
Democracy (t -1) 1.3044 0.6421 1.3246 1.8004 2.0212 3.5788 1.8144 2.1788 1.7111 3.0294 4.0215
(0.9902 (2.1886) (1.9518) (2.1096) (2.1135) (2.4863) (2.4725) (2.0350) (2.4603) (2.6712) (2.7664)
National Capabilities (t -1) 0.7372 0.0889 -0.4548 0.04978 -0.4058 -0.6127 -0.4875 0.4464 -0.7817 0.1462 -1.0692
(0.9149) (0.9412) (0.7909) (0.8998) (0.7914) (1.0138) (0.7868) (0.8402) (0.8051) (1.5984) (1.1345)
GDP Growth (t -1) -0.0386 -0.0491 -0.0804 -0.1124 -0.0658 -0.1301 -0.1063 -0.0832 -0.0913 -0.1316 -0.1725
(0.0292) (0.0833) (0.0535) (0.0727) (0.0581) (0.0795) (0.0912) (0.0671) (0.0851) (0.0985) (0.0756)
Number of countries 95 96 96 96 96 134 95 96 90 123 120
Number of observations 978 1021 1022 1026 992 1713 912 1019 845 1516 1511
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.20 0.60 0.98 0.55 0.98 0.19 0.74 0.52 0.60 0.05 0.40
Number of instuments 54 54 54 54 54 35 54 54 54 35 35
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.42 0.57 0.11 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.26 0.05 0.06  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
 
Variable Denmark Australia Belgium Switzerland Austria Finland Portugal Ireland Greece Luxembourg New Zealand
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.2609 0.0882 0.0675 0.1461 -0.0554 0.1664 0.1502 0.0947 0.0624 0.2001 0.0084
(0.0868)*** (0.1130) (0.1086) (0.1661) (0.1725) (0.1258) (0.1354) (0.1311) (0.0662) (0.0994)** (0.1290)
Level ODA (t -1) 0.4460 -0.0705 0.0335 0.3152 -0.0479 -2.3101 -0.7459 -1.9289 -0.2195 -0.9821 1.7258
(0.6566) (0.0923) (0.0264) (0.7281) (0.2065) (0.9840)** (0.5109) (1.6865) (0.3209) (0.7831) (3.0917)
Democracy (t -1) 2.7510 -0.9716 -0.5455 5.5184 10.8386 0.9432 0.3436 1.3253 0.8615 3.8979 2.6348
(2.6695) (2.5850) (3.5039) (2.5179)** (4.3368)*** (2.8679) (3.2956) (2.3814) (1.9442) (2.2461) (3.5058)
National Capabilities (t -1) -0.8702 1.7838 0.7366 0.0327 -0.0580 -0.6000 1.0325 0.0837 -1.3814 -0.1692 -0.9129
(1.0397) (1.9137) (1.2781) (0.8003) (0.2829) (0.8522) (3.2607) (0.8438) (1.7738) (0.90419) (0.8768)
GDP Growth (t -1) -0.0630 -0.1019 -0.0388 -0.0255 0.3138 -0.0894 0.1439 -0.1306 -0.0359 -0.1692 0.0048
(0.0927) (0.0952) (0.0657) (0.1876) (0.0950)*** (0.0791) (0.1322) (0.0848) (0.1696) (0.9042) (0.1284)
Number of countries 111 66 94 80 104 87 49 86 63 93 67
Number of observations 1193 601 924 336 322 878 214 800 355 627 641
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.09 0.53 0.47 0.62 0.26 0.79 0.66 0.03 0.14 0.44 0.86
Number of instruments 35 54 54 22 54 54 54 54 39 54 54
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.25 0.46 0.20 0.60 0.49 0.21 0.87 0.17 0.19 0.82 0.15  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
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Table 6: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including External Debt (GMM) 
Variable United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Canada Spain Norway Sweden
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.0346 0.0215 0.0705 0.0980 0.0356 0.1533 0.1496 0.1203 0.0714 0.1361 0.0912
(0.1393) (0.1202) (0.1130) (0.1263) (0.1235) (0.0729)** (0.1374) (0.1184) (0.1143) (0.0824)* (0.0919)
Level ODA (t -1) 0.0001 -0.0011 0.0024 -0.0013 0.0035 0.0492 -0.0850 0.0063 0.0016 -0.0433 0.2269
(0.0001) (0.0004)*** (0.0008)*** (0.1584) (0.0013)*** (0.0565) (0.0374)** (0.0019)*** (0.0005)*** (0.9377) (0.3307)
Democracy (t -1) 1.1914 0.6319 1.2373 1.6776 2.0491 3.1799 1.7416 2.0976 1.6129 3.3808 3.5652
(1.0306) (2.2389) (2.0106) (2.1931) (2.1768) (2.5501) (2.4835) (2.0763) (2.4656) (2.8248) (2.8062)
National Capabilities (t -1) 1.3839 0.7610 -0.1253 0.3708 -0.0684 -0.5169 0.2171 0.8089 -0.2824 0.0413 -0.6820
(1.2875) (1.2292) (0.9092) (0.9869) (0.9963) (0.9828) (0.9224) (1.0245) (0.8279) (1.3456) (1.0719)
External Debt (t -1) 0.0063 -0.0031 0.0185 0.0191 0.0189 0.0131 -0.0017 0.0248 0.0000 0.0125 0.0039
(0.0039)* (0.0130) (0.0101)* (0.0107)* (0.0099)* (0.0129) (0.0117) (0.0134)* (0.0155) (0.0112) (0.0144)
Number of countries 90 90 90 90 90 115 89 91 85 107 109
Number of observations 918 958 961 963 928 1545 861 955 796 1392 1386
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.40 0.86 0.79 0.62 0.63 0.08 0.85 0.68 0.88 0.10 0.23
Number of instruments 54 54 54 54 54 35 54 54 54 35 35
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.21 0.46 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.16 0.01 0.06  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
 
Variable Denmark Australia Belgium Switzerland Austria Finland Portugal Ireland Greece Luxembourg New Zealand
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.2211 0.0285 0.0396 0.0656 -0.2677 0.1047 0.0081 -0.0213 0.0587 0.1243 -0.0704
(0.0988)** (0.1459) (0.1141) (0.1416) (0.1013)*** (0.1418) (0.2251) (0.1388) (0.06749) (0.1063) (0.1510)
Level ODA (t -1) 0.3893 -0.0398 0.03363 0.3911 -0.0939 -2.1713 -0.5647 -1.9656 -0.3086 -0.6756 0.2120
(0.5959) (0.0889) (0.0218) (0.6711) (0.2023) (0.8823)** (0.2339)** (1.7354) (0.3289) (0.6145) (3.5249)
Democracy (t -1) 2.5493 -0.8621 -0.5665 4.4393 11.6869 0.8691 -0.0977 1.5286 2.1206 3.9513 2.8335
(2.7300) (2.5628) (3.5802) (2.4150)* (4.4239)*** (2.9832) (4.4798) (2.3813) (2.0395) (3.5499) (3.3168)
National Capabilities (t -1) -0.4422 2.2306 1.0567 0.1592 -0.0505 -0.2390 1.8054 0.3786 -0.1549 0.2757 -0.1303
(1.0776) (2.1975) (1.4109) (0.8593) (0.2532) (0.8342) (3.2045) (0.9093) (1.0759) (0.9286) (1.2774)
External Debt (t -1) 0.0192 0.0004 0.0008 0.0591 -0.0215 0.0217 -0.0529 0.0269 0.0974 0.0295 0.0037
(0.0100)* (0.0146) (0.01465) (0.0129)*** (0.0334) (0.0102)** (0.0217)** (0.0137) (0.0407)** (0.0279) (0.0310)
Number of countries 102 61 89 75 87 81 45 82 60 77 63
Number of observations 1125 560 872 308 282 816 182 749 339 576 604
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.09 0.42 0.43 0.75 0.63 0.59 0.41 0.14 0.56 0.18 0.45
Number of instruments 35 54 54 22 54 54 54 54 39 54 54
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.19 0.35 0.15 0.26 0.43 0.37 0.99 0.21 0.17 0.46 0.19  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
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Table 7: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including AFPTL (GMM) 
Variable United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Canada Spain Norway Sweden
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.1583 0.1044 0.1406 0.1769 0.1425 0.2415 0.2379 0.2059 0.1363 0.2393 0.1953
(0.1327) (0.1079) (0.1067) (0.1114) (0.1122) (0.0776)*** (0.1146)* (0.1067)* (0.1110) (0.0895)*** (0.0933)**
Level ODA (t -1) 0.0001 -0.0011 0.0025 0.0013 0.0037 0.0297 -0.0884 0.0068 0.0017 -1.6968 0.1191
(0.0001) (0.0004)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0147) (0.0014)*** (0.0389) (0.0398)** (0.0021)*** (0.0005)*** (1.3442) (0.3209)
Democracy (t -1) 1.2436 0.5868 1.3040 1.7496 2.0516 3.5658 1.8696 2.3033 1.5496 2.5779 4.1171
(1.0141) (2.3286) (2.1307) (2.3619) (2.2344) (2.6676) (2.5837) (2.2505) (2.4928) (2.9782) (2.9689)
AFPTL (t -1) 0.0208 -0.0033 -0.1455 0.0242 -0.1108 -0.3520 -0.1789 0.1205 -0.2211 -0.0521 -05103
(0.1008) (0.2981) (0.2191) (0.2594) (0.2151) (0.6692) (0.2477) (0.2756) (0.2287) (0.4490) (0.6085)
Number of countries 96 97 98 98 97 134 96 98 91 122 120
Number of observations 992 994 1004 1006 977 1685 900 999 818 1476 1492
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.11 0.37 0.78 0.36 0.61 0.17 0.48 0.38 0.48 0.23 0.12
Number of instruments 53 53 53 53 53 34 53 53 53 34 34
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.23 0.32 0.30 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.24 0.22 0.15 0.26 0.04  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
 
Variable Denmark Australia Belgium Switzerland Austria Finland Portugal Ireland Greece Luxembourg New Zealand
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.2977 0.1270 0.1037 0.1309 0.0032 0.1958 0.1611 0.1147 0.0528 0.1237 0.0629
(0.0869)*** (0.1299) (0.1127) (0.1546) (0.1510) (0.1195)* (0.1272) (0.1232) (0.0664) (0.0804) (0.1201)
Level ODA (t -1) 0.3750 -0.08603 0.0348 0.3958 0.0392 -2.4398 -0.4856 -1.8205 -0.2655 -0.8763 -0.1679
(0.6289) (0.0719) (0.0231) (0.7563) (0.1874) (0.9259)*** (0.2516)* (1.7251) (0.3033) (0.7925) (3.6756)
Democracy (t -1) 2.7985 -1.8135 -0.5053 5.1854 6.2454 0.8725 0.4722 0.8592 0.8921 3.3649 2.1501
(2.9044) (2.9809) (3.5538) (2.9467)* (4.7787) (2.9949) (3.2748) (2.5389) (1.9453) (3.3449) (3.8679)
AFPTL (t -1) 0.1661 -0.0225 -0.0919 0.0001 -1.9663 -0.0536 -2.1374 -0.1518 -1.1500 -0.2029 -0.5096
(0.3016) (0.2490) (0.2314) (0.2799) (0.8611)** (0.2607) (1.7412) (0.2955) (0.6929)* (0.3372) (0.4062)
Number of countries 113 66 96 80 105 89 48 87 64 84 68
Number of observations 1158 590 907 310 373 870 205 790 336 617 630
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.12 0.58 0.74 0.34 0.16 0.84 0.83 0.02 0.37 0.28 0.99
Number of instruments 34 53 53 21 53 53 53 53 38 53 53
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.19 0.29 0.21 0.53 0.42 0.09 0.94 0.11 0.17 0.42 0.20  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
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Table 8: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including Imports (GMM) 
Variable United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Canada Spain Norway Sweden
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.0507 -0.0052 0.0593 0.0642 0.0391 0.1859 0.1507 0.0727 0.1005 0.1412 0.1237
(0.1425) (0.1135) (0.1114) (0.1160) (0.1144) (0.0797)** (0.1236) (0.1059) (0.1193) (0.0968) (0.1029)
Level ODA (t -1) 0.0001 -0.0010 0.0026 -0.0016 0.0031 0.0014 -0.0836 0.0065 0.0017 -0.2393 0.0148
(0.0001) (0.0005)** (0.0007)*** (0.0159) (0.0016)** (0.0021) (0.0337)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0005)*** (0.1678) (0.0121)
Democracy (t -1) 1.5166 0.4832 1.1752 1.5869 2.3527 3.7753 1.9007 1.8686 1.4849 3.5471 4.1075
(1.0301) (2.2848) (2.0449) (2.1817) (2.2339) (2.5756) (2.5419) (2.0903) (2.5273) (2.7396) (2.8183)
National Capabilities (t -1) 1.5046 -0.1035 -0.3911 -0.1266 -0.4589 -0.5718 -0.4689 0.5239 -1.0318 0.2816 -0.6951
(1.2915) (0.9481) (0.8096) (1.1201) (0.7452) (0.9944) (0.8193) (0.8693) (0.8873) (1.1883) (1.0488)
Imports (t -1) -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0011 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0061 -0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0024)
Number of countries 78 78 78 78 78 112 77 78 73 101 98
Number of observations 806 839 847 844 811 1400 751 828 707 1245 1220
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.17 0.75 0.99 0.65 0.89 0.12 0.84 0.61 0.63 0.03 0.18
Number of instruments 54 54 54 54 54 50 54 54 54 50 50
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.43 0.69 0.28 0.38 0.25 0.13 0.31 0.15 0.30 0.28 0.16  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
 
Variable Denmark Australia Belgium Switzerland Austria Finland Portugal Ireland Greece Luxembourg New Zealand
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.2015 0.0715 0.0964 0.1225 -0.1091 0.0784 0.1779 -0.0749 0.0783 0.1110 -0.0013
(0.0909)** (0.1208) (0.1469) (0.1761) (0.1416) (0.1213) (0.1569) (0.1213) (0.0847) (0.1025) (0.1350)
Level ODA (t -1) -0.1036 -0.0786 -0.1578 0.1429 -0.1235 -2.4645 -0.5833 -2.6753 -0.1065 -0.2341 0.8533
(0.0945) (0.0724) (0.2327) (1.6622) (0.2209) (0.7010)*** (0.2419)** (0.9108)*** (0.2464) (1.7912) (2.6932)
Democracy (t -1) 2.8989 -2.0019 -2.1322 4.3672 11.7087 1.0790 -0.6479 1.9319 0.4295 14.3302 2.9715
(2.6266) (2.9029) (4.2636) (2.6959) (4.5504)*** (3.0885) (5.3539) (2.2685) (2.1758) (5.1336)*** (3.7067)
National Capabilities (t -1) 0.4832 1.9219 -0.0167 -0.4585 -0.0763 -0.1157 1.6804 -0.0709 -2.9824 -0.1169 -0.7611
(1.1407/ (2.1950) (1.2651) (1.1672) (0.2721) (0.8178) (4.0940) (0.9067) (3.1889) (1.1537) (0.9374)
Imports (t -1) -0.0039 1.6361 -0.0304 0.0033 -7.3872 -0.2899 0.0062 -0.4459 -0.7339 -0.0144 -9.9162
(1.1408) (1.0215) (0.08540) (0.0492) (8.5381) (0.0869)*** (0.0375) (0.1029)*** (0.8928) (0.0124) 8.5511
Number of countries 91 57 82 66 97 70 41 72 50 58 58
Number of observations 1001 509 565 274 313 723 180 652 285 319 565
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.06 0.30 0.22 0.45 0.26 0.81 0.78 0.10 0.83 0.57 0.72
Number of instruments 50 54 37 22 54 54 54 54 39 54 54
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.34 0.43 0.23 0.44 0.36 0.24 0.98 0.09 0.10 0.42 0.32  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
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Table 9: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries Including Exports (GMM) 
Variable United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Canada Spain Norway Sweden
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.0483 -0.0052 0.0591 0.0652 0.0387 0.1855 0.1454 0.0738 0.1017 0.1411 0.1231
(0.1425) (0.1136) (0.1114) (0.1164) (0.1141) (0.0789)** (0.1222) (0.1112) (0.1205) (0.0973) (01028)
Level ODA (t -1) 0.0001 -0.0010 0.0026 -0.0016 0.0031 0.0014 -0.0824 0.0065 0.0017 -0.2383 0.0149
(0.0001) (0.0005)** (0.0008)*** (0.0159) (0.0016)** (0.0021) (0.0340)*** (0.0021)*** (0.0005)*** (0.1675) (0.0122)
Democracy (t -1) 1.4409 0.4779 1.1811 1.5373 2.3677 3.7870 2.1581 1.8386 1.4305 3.5517 4.1456
(1.0300) (2.2873) (2.0501) (2.1805) (2.2344) (2.5779) (2.5506) (2.0852) (2.5184) (2.7453) (2.8268)
National Capabilities (t -1) 1.4987 -0.1139 -0.3900 -0.1316 -0.4626 -0.5697 -0.4627 0.5446 -1.0348 0.2798 -0.6902
(1.2954) (0.9482) (0.8089) (1.1214) (0.7427) (0.9949) (0.8167) (0.8778) (0.8881) (1.1898) (1.0494)
Exports (t -1) -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0017 -0.0084 0.0035 0.0048 -0.0090 -0.0025 -0.0019 0.0132
(0.0001)*** (0.0003)* (0.0026) (0.0013) (0.0071) (0.0133) (0.0042) (0.0073) (0.0059) (0.0203) (0.0178)
Number of countries 78 78 78 78 78 112 77 78 73 101 98
Number of observations 806 838 847 844 811 1400 751 826 707 1244 1220
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.18 0.74 0.99 0.64 0.89 0.12 0.85 0.60 0.63 0.03 0.18
Number of instruments 54 54 54 54 54 50 54 54 54 50 50
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.41 0.68 0.28 0.38 0.27 0.13 0.31 0.14 0.29 0.30 0.14  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
 
Variable Denmark Australia Belgium Switzerland Austria Finland Portugal Ireland Greece Luxembourg New Zealand
Voting coincidence (t -1) 0.2024 0.0747 0.1046 0.1226 -0.1073 0.0734 0.1511 -0.0272 0.0749 0.1064 -0.0200
(0.0909)** (0.1198) (0.1485) (0.1840) (0.1599) (0.1222) (0.1478) (0.1406) (0.0852) (0.1024) (0.1483)
Level ODA (t -1) -0.1013 -0.0925 -0.1754 0.1061 -0.1141 -2.5020 -0.5872 -2.3909 -0.1285 -1.1348 0.6634
(0.0923) (0.0743) (0.2386) (1.5939) (0.2151) (0.6981)*** (0.2143)*** (1.2824)* (0.2371) (1.6939) (3.4021)
Democracy (t -1) 2.8779 -1.9757 -2.2472 4.2919 11.3539 0.9978 0.6552 1.6682 0.2304 14.0156 2.8907
(2.6257) (2.8955) (4.1164) (2.7631) (4.6304)** (3.0808) (5.1009) (2.3918) (2.1623) (5.0174)*** (3.5272)
National Capabilities (t -1) 0.4717 1.8425 0.0535 -0.4619 -0.0729 -0.2227 1.1129 0.2139 -2.8969 -0.2468 -0.4358
(1.1358) (2.0883) (1.2947) (1.1473) (0.2756) (0.8071) (4.1734) (0.9187) (3.1303) (1.2069) (0.9426)
Exports (t -1) -0.0210 1.7861 2.1372 -0.0001 -1.1159 -0.4081 0.2556 -0.0840 -1.2645 -0.0945 -0.0414
(0.0189) (0.3342)*** (1.1779)* (0.0222) (6.8445) (0.0709)*** (0.1669) (0.0258)*** (0.5368)** (0.2687) (0.0853)
Number of countries 91 57 82 66 97 70 41 72 50 58 55
Number of observations 1001 509 565 274 313 723 180 651 285 319 498
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.06 0.38 0.23 0.45 0.30 0.76 0.58 0.06 0.98 0.61 0.78
Number of instruments 50 54 37 22 54 54 54 54 39 54 54
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.34 0.22 0.18 0.44 0.33 0.23 0.95 0.04 0.10 0.45 0.35  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
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Table 10: Bilateral Aid and UN Voting for ODA Giving Countries, 5 Year Averages (GMM) 
 
Variable United States Japan France Germany United Kingdom Netherlands Italy Canada Spain Norway Sweden
Voting coincidence (t-1) 0.4993 0.3272 0.4248 0.4383 0.3914 0.4427 0.3497 0.5134 0.3574 0.4729 0.4701
(0.1693)*** (0.1317)*** (0.1347)*** (0.1287)*** (0.1497)*** (0.1233)*** (0.1189)*** (0.1359)*** (0.1386)** (0.1527)*** (0.1411)***
Level ODA (t-1) 0.0003 -0.0027 0.0086 0.0071 0.0119 0.0285 -0.1499 0.0095 0.0027 0.3122 0.0416
(0.0002)** (0.0013)** (0.0023)*** (0.0188) (0.0028)*** (0.0279) (0.1890) (0.0043)** (0.0011)** (0.4479) (0.1782)
Democracy (t-1) 0.3982 0.6894 0.7131 0.5705 1.5776 0.5073 0.4162 0.5515 -0.1885 0.9335 -0.1558
(1.1792) (3.9027) (3.0765) (3.6315) (3.3715) (3.1699) (3.7543) (3.9182) (3.9261) (3.328) (3.6291)
National Capabilities (t-1) 1.1234 0.6027 0.5748 0.2221 0.7663 0.3956 0.3536 0.2062 0.4377 0.1223 -0.2468
(1.0805) (0.4163) (0.2687)** (0.3504) (0.3150) (0.4005) (0.3439) (0.3761) (0.3848) (0.4069) (0.5134)
Number of countries 96 98 97 98 98 136 95 98 90 119 19
Number of observations 318 328 329 329 328 497 318 330 284 433 429
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.58 0.50 0.28 0.23 0.53 039 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.40 0.11
Number of instruments 17 17 17 17 17 13 17 17 17 13 13
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.14 0.01 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.17 0.10 0.03  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
 
Variable Denmark Australia Belgium Austria Finland Portugal Ireland Greece Luxembourg New Zealand
Voting coincidence (t-1) 0.4493 0.2487 0.3953 0.6517 0.4235 0.2117 0.3753 0.8437 0.2489 0.3166
(0.1616)*** (0.1554) (0.1448)*** (0.1947)*** (0.1699)** (0.1724) (0.1134)*** (0.2507)*** (0.1470)* (0.1499)**
Level ODA (t-1) 0.1717 0.3193 0.1648 0.2699 0.8504 1.3882 3.9970 0.2109 2.5814 0.4001
(0.1742) (0.4509) (0.0579)*** (0.3097) (1.3357) (0.8162)* (0.9727)*** (0.9863) (2.0938) (0.2347)*
Democracy (t-1) 1.0437 -1.8949 0.9191 0.1748 -3.8671 4.6568 -1.7366 2.2602 -0.5277 -3.9636
(3.8318) (3.2776) (3.6327) (3.9919) (2.2367) (7.6406) (3.8983) (5.4549) (3.7741) (2.5467)
National Capabilities (t-1) 0.7848 0.04542 0.4504 -0.2686 0.2650 0.4976 0.7143 0.7417 0.9400 0.4512
(0.3844) (0.3619) (0.3143) (0.4489) (0.3697) (0.5417) (0.3571) (0.5362) (0.4084) (0.3545)
Number of countries 105 77 96 124 92 51 89 65 88 71
Number of observations 356 224 310 374 288 108 272 121 257 227
Arellano-Bond test (p-value) 0.26 0.41 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.06 0.58 0.83 0.47
Number of instruments 13 17 17 17 17 17 17 14 17 17
Hansen J stat. (p-value) 0.36 0.42 0.12 0.06 0.12 0.60 0.29 0.32 0.29 0.22  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10% significance level.   
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Appendix 1 
Variable description and source 
Variable Description Source 
Voting coincidence Number of times a country votes the 
same as country X (either voting both 
yes, both voting no, both voting 
abstentions, or both being absent), 
divided by the total number of votes in 
each year. 
United Nations Bibliographic 
Information System and author 
calculation 
 
Level ODA 
 
The annual amount of a DAC country’s 
official development assistance as a 
proportion of the total official 
development assistance received by the 
recipient country  
 
OECD’s online database 
 
Democracy 
 
A dichotomous dummy variable 
classifying a country as a democracy 
(d=1) or not (d=0)  
 
Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 
(2010) 
 
National Capability 
Composite indicator of national 
capability, based on total population, 
urban population, iron and steel 
production, energy consumption, military 
personnel, and military expenditure. This 
measure is generally computed by 
summing all observations on each of the 
6 capability components for a given year, 
converting each state’s absolute 
component to a share of the international 
system, and then averaging across the six 
components. 
 
Correlates of War (COW) website 
(http://www.correlatesofwar.org) 
 
GDPC 
Gross Domestic Product  Per Capita 
(constant 2008 USD) 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
 
Exports 
 
Exports from DAC country X to aid 
recipient country as a percentage of 
recipient GDP  
 
Direction of Trade Statistics 
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
Imports 
 
Imports from DAC country X to aid 
recipient country as a percentage of 
recipient GDP 
 
Direction of Trade Statistics 
(International Monetary Fund) 
 
 
GDP growth 
 
Real Gross Domestic Product growth 
(annual percent) 
 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
 
External Debt 
 
 
AFPTL 
 
 
 
External debt stocks as a percentage of 
Gross National Income 
 
Armed forces personnel as a percentage 
of the total labor force 
 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
 
World Development Indicators 
(World Bank) 
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation Observatioons
Voting Coincidence Australia (% times 100) 50.38 0 96.7 17.93 2703
Voting Coincidence Austria (% times 100) 54.35 0 100 18.17 2702
Voting Coincidence Belgium (% times 100) 50.97 0 98.7 17.69 2701
Voting Coincidence Canada (% times 100) 49.35 0 96.7 16.95 2703
Voting Coincidence Denmark (% times 100) 52.60 0 98.80 17.89 2702
Voting Coincidence Finland (% times 100) 52.41 0 100 17.98 2703
Voting Coincidence France (% times 100) 45.22 0 88.5 15.54 2703
Voting Coincidence Germany (% times 100) 51.44 0 98.81 18.03 2697
Voting Coincidence Greece (% times 100) 51.86 0 100 19.55 2703
Voting Coincidence Ireland (% times 100) 54.81 0 96.72 18.30 2681
Voting Coincidence Italy (% times 100) 52.17 0 98.81 17.94 2703
Voting Coincidence Japan (% times 100) 53.71 0 94.05 17.83 2701
Voting Coincidence Luxembourg (% times 100) 51.53 0 100 17.81 2703
Voting Coincidence Netherlands (% times 100) 51.26 0 98.81 17.82 2702
Voting Coincidence New Zealand (% times 100) 57.27 0 95.08 18.12 2699
Voting Coincidence Norway (% times 100) 52.48 0 97.62 17.52 2701
Voting Coincidence Portugal (% times 100) 52.96 0 100 18.04 2703
Voting Coincidence Spain (% times 100) 53.51 0 100 17.90 2703
Voting Coincidence Sweden (% times 100) 54.15 0 96.43 18.02 2703
Voting Coincidence Switzerland (% times 100) 56.11 0 98.68 16.77 1081
Voting Coincidence United Kingdom (% times 100) 44.69 0 93.42 16.22 2701
Voting Coincidence United States (% times 100) 16.57 0 85.92 10.72 2703
Level ODA Australia (% times 100) 7.14 -12.5 121.99 17.27 1364
Level ODA Austria (% times 100) 0.80 -75.00 99.54 4.97 1959
Level ODA Belgium (% times 100) 1.38 -111.11 100 4.84 1877
Level ODA Canada (% times 100) 1.97 -1086.11 177.5 24.09 2278
Level ODA Denmark (% times 100) 1.73 -419.44 72.06 11.61 1534
Level ODA Finland (% times 100) 0.48 -55 20.83 2.10 1626
Level ODA France (% times 100) 8.93 -1963.89 402.49 44.63 2427
Level ODA Germany (% times 100) 6.30 -755.56 533.74 25.08 2426
Level ODA Greece (% times 100) 0.42 -0.41 25.7 1.56 957
Level ODA Ireland (% times 100) 0.63 -0.76 28.03 1.99 1461
Level ODA Italy (% times 100) 2.93 -37.04 424.94 14.09 1879
Level ODA Japan (% times 100) 12.11 -591.98 4541.67 94.67 2511
Level ODA Luxembourg (% times 100) 0.55 -4.24 17.18 1.38 1270
Level ODA Netherlands (% times 100) 1.12 -6655.56 322.59 145.29 2117
Level ODA New Zealand (% times 100) 1.50 -13.89 36.47 4.48 1345
Level ODA Norway (% times 100) 2.43 -372.22 56.55 9.55 1899
Level ODA Portugal (% times 100) 4.16 -8.33 100 11.58 574
Level ODA Spain (% times 100) 1.14 -5625 421.98 139.50 1717
Level ODA Sweden (% times 100) 1.65 -1061.11 57.22 24.60 1907
Level ODA Switzerland (% times 100) 0.95 -891.67 45.72 20.61 1903
Level ODA United Kingdom (% times 100) 3.11 -1472.22 233.27 35.98 2155
Level ODA United States (% times 100) 16.23 -2611 15958.33 344.56 2224
Democracy  0.47 0 1 0.50 2759
National Capability (% times 100) 0.37 0 19.86 1.41 2548
GDP Per Capita 3744.26 77.82 38569.23 5736.05 2597
GDP growth 4.02 -50.25 106.28 7.04 2610
External Debt 77.55 0.14 1031.38 94.74 2045
AFPTL 1.73 0 15 2.22 2509  
